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5Abstract
This paper studies the adoption and diffusion of energy-saving technologies in a vintage
model. An important characteristic of the model is that vintages are modeled as being
complementary: there are returns to diversity of using different vintages. We analyse
how diffusion patterns and adoption behaviour are affected by complementarity and
learning-by-using. It is shown that the stronger the complementarity between different
vintages and the stronger the learning-by-using, the longer it takes before firms scrap
(seemingly) inferior technologies. We argue that this is a potentially relevant part of the
explanation of the energy-efficiency paradox. Furthermore we explore the effects of
energy tax policies.
71. Introduction
Concerns about global climate change associated with the combustion of fossil fuels
urge a call for the development and widespread adoption of energy-saving technologies.
It is beyond doubt that the development of new energy saving  technologies - often
labelled with the subsequent phases of invention and innovation -  plays an important
role in meeting policy targets with respect to the stabilisation or reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions. The diffusion of existing technologies, however, is at least equally
important, costly and difficult, as the development of new technologies (see, for
example, Jovanovic, 1997). It has indeed been shown that the widespread adoption of
existing energy-saving technologies could enable a significant reduction in energy use,
especially in the short and medium term (see for example de Beer 1998, IWG 1997). At
the same time, however, it is known that diffusion of new technologies is a lengthy
process, that adoption of new technologies is costly and that many firms continue to
invest in old and (seemingly) inferior technologies. The latter phenomenon has become
known as the energy-efficiency paradox: the existing gap between the most energy-
efficient technologies available at some point in time and those that are actually in use
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Jaffe et al. 1999). The aim of this paper is to contribute to our
understanding of adoption behaviour of firms and of diffusion processes of new energy-
saving technologies in order to improve our understanding of the energy-efficiency
paradox.
The question why firms do not invest in seemingly superior technologies has already
achieved much attention in the literature. We can distinguish four major explanations
for the relatively slow diffusion of new technologies. The first explanation is that the
combination of uncertainty and some degree of irreversibility in investment creates an
option-value of waiting (see, for example, Balcer and Lippman 1984, Dixit and Pindyck
1994 and Farzin et al. 1998). The second explanation deals with strategic issues: in a
world characterised by spill-overs and limited appropriability, the presence of
(expected) rival innovation and imitation creates an argument for firms to postpone
innovation or adoption (see, for example, Kamien and Schwartz 1972, Reinganum
1981). The third explanation emphasises the fact that over time the performance of
existing technologies improves and their price reduces due to learning and spillover
effects (see, for example, Jovanovic and Lach 1989 and OECD/IEA 2000). A final
explanation emphasises the role of vested interests. As switching to new technologies
(temporarily) reduces expertise and destroys rents associated with working with
relatively old technologies for particular subgroups in the economy, these groups may
8engage in efforts aimed at keeping the old technologies in place (see, for example,
Canton et al. 1999, Jovanovic and Nyarko 1994, Krusell and Ríos-Rull 1996).
We offer two explanations for the slow diffusion of energy-saving technologies that
complement the before-mentioned explanations. This is done by developing a simple
two-sector macro-economic model including a final goods sector, producing a
homogenous consumption good, and a capital production sector producing
heterogeneous vintages. The first explanation is rooted in a complementarity effect and
the second one in a learning effect with the user of the technology. The distinctive
features of our model are as follows1. First, technology is embodied in physical capital.
Newer vintages need less labour and energy to produce the same output which leads to a
vintage structure of production. Second, capital of different vintages are imperfect
substitutes in production. The economy exhibits a ‘taste for diversity’ of vintages
creating an incentive to invest in both new and older technologies. Third, the
representative firm in the final goods sector gains expertise in a technology by using the
technologies in its production process. In other words, we include learning-by-using.2
Fourth, our model allows for the endogenous determination of the number of vintages
used in the final goods sector, so we offer an economically motivated approach for the
scrapping of vintages.
In contrast with traditional vintage models, our model exhibits a ‘taste for diversity’ of
vintages. We argue that complementarity is not so much a by-product of past
investment decisions, but an essential ingredient in the process of technological change.
Many new technologies pass through a life cycle, in which they initially complement
older technologies, and only subsequently (and often slowly) substitute for the older
technologies. A number of historical examples, like for example the replacement of the
waterwheel by the steam engine, illustrates the role of complementarities in this ‘life
cycle view’ of technological change (see for example Rosenberg 1982, Young 1993b).
                                                          
1 The model presented in this paper essentially extends the basic framework developed in
De Groot, Hofkes and Mulder (2000). The extension consists of incorporating energy as
a production factor into the model.
2 We follow Rosenberg (1982:121-122) in distinguishing three basic types of learning:
learning in R&D stages, learning at the manufacturing stage and learning as a result of
use of the product. We refer to the second type as learning-by-doing and to the last type
as learning-by-using. In our model, the final goods sector gains experience in using
capital goods.
9One can argue that modern production processes consist of even more interrelated and
mutually reinforcing technologies than the documented historical examples. Whereas
Young (1993b) employs the idea of complementary innovation, we focus on the
complementarity effect in diffusion processes. It is evident that at the economy level
there is continuous investment in both old and newly arrived technologies. It can be
argued that this pattern also exists at the sector or even the firm level, depending on the
technology and the type of production process. It is this complementarity effect that is at
the heart of our model.
The taste for technological diversity may further be intensified by the learning-by-using
effect in the final goods sector. In accordance with broad historical evidence (see for
example Mokyr 1990, Rosenberg 1982 and Young 1993a) we allow for new
technologies to be inferior initially to more mature technologies. Learning-by-using
improves the productivity of the new technology over time. A switch of technologies
temporarily reduces expertise and counter effects the improved potential productivity
level and the decreased energy-capital ratio of newer vintages. The prospect of such a
productivity drop prevents agents from immediate and ‘total’ switching, but rather
induces a gradual adoption of new technologies resulting in coexistence of old and new
technologies.
There are a number of related articles in which issues of learning and technological
innovation and diffusion are analysed. Without extensive discussion, we refer to, for
example, Aghion and Howitt (1996), Aghion et al. (1997, 1999), Arrow (1962), Chari
and Hopenhayn (1991), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Parente (1994), Stokey (1988)
and Young (1993a,b). The main differences between these articles and ours lie in the
specifications we make with respect to the complementarity of vintages, the
interpretation of intermediate goods as technologies, the emphasis on diffusion instead
of innovation, the endogenous scrapping mechanism and, finally, the inclusion of
energy-biased technological change. In focussing on diffusion and adoption our paper
differs from most literature on induced or endogenous technological change in which
the focus is almost solely on innovation (see, for example, Goulder and Schneider 1999
and Goulder and Mathai 2000).
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model. In section 3
we derive the solution of the model. Section 4 contains some comparative statics
including an analysis of the effects of learning and taxation. Section 5 concludes.
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2. The model
The model that we develop is essentially a simple two-sector vintage model that is
characterised by learning-by-using and ‘returns to diversity’. The two sectors that we
distinguish are (i) a final goods sector in which a homogeneous consumption good is
produced using labour, capital and energy, and (ii) a capital goods sector consisting of T
monopolistically competitive firms each producing a unique vintage of capital. Labour
is used for assemblage of final consumption goods and the production of capital or
intermediate inputs. Energy is a complement to capital. For simplicity, capital is
assumed to be non-durable. The model can hence also be considered as a model with
heterogeneous intermediate inputs. These intermediates or vintages are assumed to be
imperfect substitutes. The formulation that we use in our model to capture this is
inspired by the product-variety theory which started with the seminal work of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and was later extended and applied by, for example, Ethier (1982),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990). An advantage - at least for
presentational purposes - of this assumption is that the coexistence of different vintages
can, by definition, not be explained on the basis of incomplete depreciation of the
existing capital stock as is common in ‘traditional’ vintage models. Furthermore, our
vintage approach offers an attractive framework to analyse energy-efficient technology
diffusion because it allows us to include investment decisions at the firm level and
(energy) characteristics at the technology level in a macro-economic setting.
2.1 The final goods production sector
The final goods sector produces a homogeneous consumption good according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
1
t t YtY K L
α α−
= (1)
in which tY  represents output produced in year t, and tK  and YtL  are the capital- and
labour input in final goods production, respectively. Energy is assumed to be
complementary to capital (we return to this below). Capital is an aggregate of vintages
of capital goods. Vintages are characterised by the first year of their availability τ.
Following the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we formulate the aggregate
capital stock as:
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in which T is the (endogenous) mass of vintages in use, ,tKτ  is the amount of capital of
vintage τ used in year t  (where t T tτ− ≤ ≤ ) and ,tAτ  is a vintage-specific
productivity parameter. Alternatively, T can be interpreted as the age of the oldest
vintage in use. Technological change is embodied in new vintages. The elasticity of
substitution between any pair of vintages (in efficiency units) is denoted by ε. Vintages
are assumed to be imperfect substitutes (1 ε< < ∞ ). This formulation implies that
firms have an incentive to invest in older technologies, even if new technologies are
available that are ‘better’ when considered in isolation. It is a common characteristic in
vintage modelling that it is optimal for firms to invest only in best practice technologies
(Meijers 1994).3 The very reason that old and new vintages coexist in most vintage
models is that once firms have incurred the (partly) sunk investment cost, it may not be
optimal to replace existing capital goods once a superior technology becomes available.
According to equation (2), however, old and new vintages coexist because of a taste for
diversity and, hence, firms keep investing in older vintages. The strength of this
complementarity effect is defined by the substitution elasticity parameter ε; the larger ε,
the lower the degree of complementarity.
The productivity of vintages develops over time according to two factors. The first one
is exogenous. As we do not elaborate on the innovation process in the ‘intermediate
capital’ sector but rather focus on the diffusion of the new vintages in the final goods
sector we just assume that newer vintages - as they are brought on the market - are more
productive than older vintages when those were brought on the market. The second
factor is endogenous: vintages improve as they are used. Hence, the productivity
endogenously depends on the cumulative investments in vintages. We further label this
learning-by-using. More specifically, we assume that the productivity of vintages ( ,tAτ )
develops according to
( )1 max, 0 , 01 (1 )g gt tA A e aC A A eτ λ ττ τ τ−= + − + − (3)
                                                          
3 A notable exception is Soete and Turner (1984) who model technology diffusion in a
macro-economic model.
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In this specification, A0  is initial productivity, g is an exogenously given growth rate of
the productivity of new vintages, a measures the strength of learning-by-using effects,
Ct  represents past cumulative investments in vintage τ ( , ,
t
t sC K dsτ τ
τ
= ), λ represents
the curvature of the learning-curve and maxτA is the vintage-specific maximum
productivity level (that is, the productivity level when the technology has matured). For
simplicity, we assume that maxτA  is in fixed proportion γ=(≥1) to the productivity at the
date of introduction of the vintage ( ττ γ geAA 0max = ). In the special case in which γ=1,
the learning-by-using mechanism is absent and productivity of vintages purely depends
on the exogenous improvements. The assumption that 0<λ<1 implies that the
productivity of a technology in the presence of learning-by-using (γ>1) gradually
converges to the mature productivity level maxτA once the technology starts to penetrate
into the production process. For the time being, we assume for reasons of analytical
tractability of the model that learning-by-using is absent (γ=1). We generalise the
specification for the productivity development and discuss the implications of learning-
by-using for diffusion patterns and adoption of technologies in section 4.2.
As we already mentioned, the use of energy of a particular vintage at a point in time is
directly related to the use of capital. Empirical literature supports low substitution
possibilities between energy and capital (Kemfert 1998, Kuper and van Soest 1999). For
reasons of analytical tractability, we make the extreme assumption of no substitution
possibilities:
, ,t tE Kτ τ τψ=                     0τψ > (4)
where ,tEτ  is the energy input for vintage τ at time t and τψ  is the vintage-specific
energy-capital ratio.4 The vintage-specific energy-capital ratio is assumed to decline at
an exogenously given rate f:
  0
fe ττψ ψ −= ( 0)f ≥ (5)
                                                          
4 Note that we basically describe the production structure in the final goods sector as a
nested Cobb-Douglas function in which capital and energy enter in one nest yielding
capital services where substitution possibilities between capital and energy are assumed
to be absent (for simplicity).
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Newer vintages use less energy than older vintages due to exogenous technological
progress. Total energy use in the economy equals ,
t
t t
t T
E E dτ τ
−
= .
Producers in the final goods sector operate under perfect competition and a
representative firm maximises profit π :
, , ,
t t
t Yt t t Yt K t t Et t
t T t T
P Y w L p K d p E dτ τ τπ τ τ
− −
= − − − (6)
in which YP , w, Kp τ and Ep  denote the output price, the wage rate, the price of capital
goods of a specific vintage and the energy price, respectively (we omit time-indices if
possible). In the remainder we assume that the price of energy is exogenously given
(determined on the world market). The wage rate is taken to be the numeraire of the
model (w=1). Vintage capital is bought from the capital goods sector to which we turn
in the next subsection.
2.2 The capital production sector
The capital production sector consists of a mass of T monopolistically competitive
firms, each producing a specific vintage according to5
, ,t K tK Lτ τ= (7)
In addition, in each period firms in this sector have to pay a fixed cost in terms of labour
(Lf) before being able to produce. Monopoly rents have to compensate for these costs.
Firms maximise their profits according to
, , , ,max ( )t K t t K t fp K L L wτ τ τ τπ = − + (8)
                                                          
5 We assume that in each period, a new vintage becomes available due to an exogenous
process of technological innovation and only one firm acquires the right to produce
capital of this particular vintage. It is of course possible to generalize here and to model a
separate sector producing the brands and selling these to the firms producing the capital.
In such a setting, firms in the capital production sector would be willing to buy the patent
to produce the specific brand and acquire the monopoly right to produce, provided that
the profits that can be earned over time are equal to the costs of the patent (compare, for
example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991). We think that such a generalization, though
interesting, would not add to the basic insights we want to emphasise in this paper.
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We assume a constant and exogenous labour supply L. The model is closed by imposing
labour market equilibrium:
,( )
t
Yt K t f
t T
L L L L dτ τ
−
= + + (9)
In the next section, we discuss the solution of the model, focusing on the allocation of
labour and the determination of the number of vintages used in the production process.
3. Solution of the model
Final goods sector
Producers in the final goods sector perform a standard profit maximisation problem in
two stages. First, they determine the optimal relative demand for (the composite of)
capital, including energy, and labour by maximising the profit function (6). Using the
expression for the use of energy (equation (4)), this results in the standard allocation-
rule for a Cobb-Douglas production function implying constant cost shares of capital,
including energy costs, and labour:
( )
1
t
K E
K t E t t T
Y Y
p p K d
P K p K
wL wL
τ τ τψ τψ α
α
−
+
+
= =
−
 (10)
in which PK is the capital index of the composite capital good (we omit time indices
when possible). Second, producers decide on the optimal amount of each vintage by
solving the following maximisation problem:
( ) 11max
t
K
t T
A K d
τ
ε
εε
ε
τ τ τ
−−
−



  ( ). .
t
K E K E
t T
s t p p K d P K p Eτ τ τψ τ
−
+ ≤ + (11)
Optimisation yields a downward sloping demand curve for capital of a specific vintage:
( )
( )
1
K E
s
s Ks E s
p pAK K
A p p
εε
τ ττ
τ
ψ
ψ
−
−
 +
=  + 
  (12)
The relative demand for two vintages of different age (s and τ) thus depends on their
relative productivity and their relative prices including energy costs. The ‘real’ or
effective energy costs are determined by the (exogenous) energy price and the energy-
capital ratio.
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Capital production sector
Producers in the vintage production sector maximise their profits (equation (8)) subject to
the downward-sloping demand curve for the vintage that they produce (equation (12)).
This results in standard mark-up pricing, according to which the producers of vintages put
a mark-up over labour costs and a factor including vintage specific energy costs:
0
1 1
E
K
K
pp w
L
τ τ
τ
τ
π ψε
ε ε
∂
= ⇔ = +
∂ − −
 (13)
This mark-up is larger the larger the complementarity between different vintages (i.e.,
the smaller ε) and the larger the vintage specific energy costs of the firms in the final
goods sector (i.e. the larger Ep τψ ). This basically concludes the description of
behaviour of firms in our economy.
Number of vintages and labour allocation
The model is subsequently solved by determining the number of vintages that can be
sustained in the economy (that is, the age of the oldest vintage that can be sustained). To
understand this intuitively, it is important to notice that newer vintages are more
productive than older ones and the producers of vintages have to pay a fixed cost in
terms of labour. As a result of the gradual increase in productivity of newer vintages,
the (relative) demand for old vintages will gradually decline over time. The
complementarity between vintages of different age is the reason that firms do not
immediately shift to the most productive vintage. At some point in time, however, the
demand for a vintage becomes so low that it can no longer profitably be supplied by the
producer of that vintage. Supply will stop and the vintage disappears from the market.
This ‘scrapping’ of vintages is - in contrast with the more traditional vintage literature -
caused by the impossibilities to profitably supply the vintage, whereas the traditional
vintage literature explains scrapping from the fact that at some point in time, the vintage
can no longer profitably be used by the owner. Our model thereby offers an alternative
economically motivated and supply oriented explanation for scrapping of vintages that
differs from, for example, Den Hartog and Tjan (1980) and Malcolmson (1975).
For determining the number of vintages used, we first need to determine the allocation
of labour over the production or assemblage of final goods and the production of
vintages, respectively. Using the fact that cost shares of aggregate capital and
intermediates (i.e. vintage capital) are constant, we can determine the allocation of
16
labour. For the time being, we assume for reasons of analytical tractability of the model
that the energy-capital ratio τψ  is constant for all vintages ( τψ ψ= ). We generalise
and discuss the implications of allowing for a vintage-specific energy-capital ratio for
diffusion patterns and adoption of technologies in section 4.3.
Using equations (7), (10) and (13), and assuming a constant energy-capital ratio, we
derive the allocation of labour as  (see Appendix A):
(1 ) 1
1
t
E
Y K
t T
pL L d
w τ
α ε ψ
τ
α ε
−
− 
= +
− 
 (14)
This expression reveals that more assemblage labour will be used relative to labour used
for producing vintages, the smaller the share parameter in the production function of
final goods, the larger the energy price and the energy-capital ratio, and the lower the
elasticity of substitution. The latter is caused by the fact that a low elasticity of
substitution results in relatively high prices of vintages due to mark-up pricing and
results in a shift from capital to labour in final goods production. An increase in the
costs for energy also results in relatively high prices of vintages due to mark-up pricing
and results therefore as well in a shift from capital to labour in final goods production.
Substituting this equation in the definition for the labour market equilibrium (equation
(9)) and rewriting yields the expression for the labour used to produce the vintage
capital stock (see Appendix A):
( 1)
( ) (1 )
t t
K f
Et T t T
wL d L L d
w pτ
α ε
τ τ
ε α α ε ψ
− −

−
= −
− + − 
(15)
Firms in the capital production sector continue producing their specific vintage as long
as they are compensated for their production costs. So they produce as long as
( )K K fp K L L wτ τ τ≥ + (16)
Using the production function for vintages and mark-up pricing (equations (7) and (13))
and assuming a constant energy-capital ratio ( τψ ψ= ), this expression can be
rewritten (with equality) as
1 ( 1)
K f E
K
L L p
L w
τ
τ
ε ψ
ε ε
+
= −
− −
(17)
This expression basically determines the minimal required scale of operation for a
producer of vintages (and hence, the minimal demand for a particular vintage that is
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needed for the producer of that vintage to be able to operate profitably). From (17) and
using (7) this minimal demand can be derived as
1
1
f
E
K L Lp
w
ε
ψ

−
= = 
 +

 (18)
in which ,t T tK K −=  is the amount of the oldest vintage that will be produced and
,Kt T tL L −=  is labour used for its production. Clearly, the minimum scale of operation
or the minimal demand for a particular vintage is larger the larger the fixed cost and the
larger the elasticity of substitution (and hence the lower the mark-up the producers of
the vintages can charge). Any firm that would intend to produce an older vintage for
which there would be less demand due to its lower productivity would make losses.
Having determined the production level of the oldest vintage, we can uniquely
determine the production levels of more recent vintages which are in use by combining
the expression for the relative demand for different vintages and the productivity
difference between these vintages. Substituting the expressions for the capital price
(equation (13)) into equation (12) and rewriting yields (in the absence of learning-by-
using (γ=1) and under the assumption of a constant energy-capital ratio ( τψ ψ= )) (see
Appendix B):
( 1)( )
,
g T t
K tL Le
ε τ
τ
− + −
=   (19)
Figure 1 graphically illustrates this expression by displaying the production of one
particular vintage (arriving on the market at t=τ) over time. This expression reveals that
in the presence of exogenous improvements of the performance of newer vintages
(g>0), more labour is used for the production of more recent vintages (higher τ). This
effect is reinforced when the degree of complementarity among vintages declines (ε
increases). We discuss the implications of allowing for a vintage-specific energy-capital
ratio τψ  (i.e. f>0) for diffusion patterns and adoption of technologies in section 4.3,
using a generalised version of (19) (see Appendix B).
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Figure 1. Demand for one vintage during its lifetime
The total amount of labour used for the production of vintages with different levels of
energy efficiency equals (using equations (18) and (19)):
( 1) ( 1)
( 1)
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1 1
( 1) 1
gT gTt T
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K t
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L e L e
L d Le d
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−  + 
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  (20)
Combining equations (15) and (20) solves the model for the mass of vintages that can
be sustained in the economy (or, alternatively, the age of the oldest vintages in use).
This solution for T  is given by the following implicit function:
( ) ( )( 1)( ) (1 ) 1 ( 1) 0gTE f E fw p L e g p w L TLεε α α ε ψ α ε ψ− − + − − − − + − = (21)
4. Comparative statics
The aim of this section is to illustrate the comparative statics of the model. This will
mainly be done by relying on a graphical method that enables us to both illustrate the
L
τKL
gTeL )1( −ε
τ T+τ )(ttime
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solution of the model as discussed in the previous section and the comparative statics. In
section 4.1, we will discuss the importance of the degree of complementarity between
different vintages for understanding the adoption and diffusion of new vintages. In
section 4.2, we elaborate on the importance of learning-by-using. This will be done by
generalising the development of the productivity of vintages as we introduced it in
section 2. In section 4.3, we analyse the adoption and diffusion process of a new
energy-efficient technology. More specifically, we analyse how energy-efficient
technologies diffuse in the presence of complementarity and how the diffusion process
can be affected by energy policies.
4.1 The effects of complementarity
The degree of complementarity is captured by the elasticity of substitution between the
vintages. The consequences of an increase in the elasticity of substitution (that is, a
lower degree of complementarity) can best be understood by dividing the total effect in
three components. (Note that we assume for the time being that there is no learning.)
First, increased substitutability reduces the mark-up that producers of intermediates can
charge (see equation (13)). Consequently, the minimal demand required for these
producers to operate profitably increases. Secondly, increased substitutability implies
that the relative demand for vintages is more responsive to increases in productivity of
newer vintages (see (12)). Finally, increased substitutability lowers the price of
intermediates relative to wages. As a consequence, firms in the final goods sector will,
ceteris paribus, increase their demand for intermediates. These three effects can be
illustrated in a graph. This is done in Figure 2.6
                                                          
6 Figure 2 is based on a discretized version of the model with the following
parametrization: α=0.5, w=1 (numeraire), g=0.05, A0=1,=γ=0, L=300, Lf=2,
ψ=1,=pΕ=2.=The elasticity of substitution is equal to ε=4.2=in the low-complementarity
case and ε=7.4 in the high-complementarity case. This results in T=6 and T=11,
respectively. Details are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 2. Demand for different vintages in absence of learning
This figure depicts the demand for vintages of different age (on the vertical axis) as a
function of the date of introduction on the market (on the horizontal axis). The most
recent (current) vintage is located most to the right in the figure. The figure can be
understood as follows. Consider first the case in which the elasticity of substitution is
low (the dashed line). The upward slope of the line reflects the fact that newer vintages
(located more to the right) have a higher productivity and consequently have a higher
demand. The demand of the oldest vintage is given as the minimal required demand as
defined in equation (17) and is represented by the lowest point on the dashed line. The
surface below this line is equal to the amount of labour that is available for the
production of vintages as it is given in equation (14). Combining these three elements
yields a unique solution of the model which is essentially characterised by the age of the
oldest vintage.
Let us now consider what happens when the elasticity of substitution increases. First,
the minimal required demand increases because of a reduced mark-up. This implies,
ceteris paribus, a reduction of the equilibrium number of vintages. Second, the demand
curve gets steeper as the relative demand for vintages becomes more responsive to
productivity differences. Ceteris paribus, this implies that the equilibrium number of
vintages that can be sustained in the economy declines. Third, producers of final goods
shift towards capital as this becomes cheaper. This is reflected by an upward shift of the
demand curve. This effect works opposite to the previous two effects and implies that
more vintages can be sustained. It can be shown, however, that the former two effects
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dominate for reasonable parameter values7, so increased substitutability reduces the
number of vintages that can be sustained. The other way around, it can be concluded
that complementarity thus slows down the rate of modernisation of the capital stock.
4.2 The effects of learning-by-using
In the previous section, we have assumed a learning effect to be absent for reasons of
analytical tractability. In this subsection we include learning-by-using into the model
according to the specification given in equation (3). This implies that the productivity of
a vintage increases over time as a function of past cumulative investment in that
vintage. The productivity improvement is initially relatively large. Furthermore, it is
bounded in the sense that there is a vintage-specific maximum productivity level. This
formulation captures the available empirical evidence that productivity increases at a
relatively fast rate just after the vintage is introduced, in order to slow down at later
stages, and levels off when the technology matures (Grübler et al. 1999).
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that the initial learning rate can be quite strong.
This implies that situations can arise in which productivity of vintages that have been
introduced some periods ago exceeds productivity of vintages that have just been
introduced. Figure 3 depicts a typical example of this kind of productivity development
of three different vintages. The newer vintage (starting more to the right) is potentially
more productive as it comes on the market (at t=τ), but initially the old technology
outperforms the new technology due to learning-by-using.
                                                          
7 The generality of this result has not yet been proven, but numerical experiments so far
have shown that the result is valid for a wide range of parameter values. Details are
available from the authors, upon request.
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Figure 3. Productivity development of different vintages with learning-by-using
The productivity development reflected in Figure 3 implies that it is possible (dependent
on the optimal number of vintages) that there is a vintage of intermediate age that is
characterized by the highest productivity. Older vintages are less productive since their
learning-by-using potential has declined (or, in other words, those vintages have
matured), whereas newer vintages have not yet matured and experienced the
productivity improvements due to learning-by-using. The implications of such
developments for the diffusion of new technologies are illustrated in figure 4, which is
equivalent to Figure 2, but now for the case with learning-by-using.8
                                                          
8 Figure 4 is based on a discretized version of the model with the following
parametrization: α=0.5, w=1 (numeraire), g=0.05, A0=1,=γ=1.25, a=0.2 , λ=0.5,=L=300,
Lf=2, ψ=1,=pΕ=2.=The elasticity of substitution is equal to ε=3.95=in the low-
complementarity case and ε=5.8 in the high-complementarity case. This results in T=12
and T=8 respectively. Details are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 4. Demand for different vintages with learning-by-using
Clearly, new vintages are initially demanded at a relatively limited scale due to their
low productivity, but as they improve due to learning-by-using demand will increase, in
order to subsequently be gradually phased out of the production process as the vintage
matures and ultimately becomes obsolete. The positive effect of learning-by-using on
the productivity of older vintages provides a barrier to adopt newer vintages and, hence,
slows down the diffusion process. Based upon the similar logic as explained in section
4.1, a higher elasticity of substitution will result in less vintages being used in the
production process and at the same time stronger responses to differences in
productivity levels between vintages of different age.
4.3 The effects of energy-efficiency and energy price
In this subsection we numerically analyse the effects of changes in energy efficiency
and energy price on the diffusion pattern of vintages. First, we compare two economies
or two firms that differ from each other in terms of energy efficiency. All other things
being equal, we run our model for two constant values of the energy-capital ratio
parameter ψ - that is the two economies or firms differ in terms of energy-efficiency,
but for each economy or firm the energy-efficiency is constant over all vintages. Figure
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5 shows the demand for vintages in absence of learning for a situation with high and
low energy-efficiency.9
Figure 5. Demand for different vintages under two levels of energy-intensity (in absence
of learning)
Because of the fact that energy is complementary to capital (equation (4)) a higher ψ
implies that the economy or the firm needs a relatively high amount of energy and is
thus relatively energy inefficient. This implies that energy costs comprise a significant
part of the costs of the capital-energy composite in the final goods sector. Vice versa
this means that the price of vintage capital is of relatively less weight in determining
investment decisions of firms. As a result monopolistic producers of vintage capital are
able to set a relatively high mark-up (equation (13)): the demand for vintages will react
only moderately to an increase in capital price and because of the high mark-up
producers of vintages need less demand for their vintage to compensate for their fixed
costs (equation (18)). Hence, the economy will sustain a relatively large number of
vintages. This is illustrated in Figure 5 with the dashed line. From equation (13) it can
be seen that an increase in the energy price, for example because of an energy tax,
yields the same result.
                                                          
9 Figure 4 is based on a discretized version of the model with the following
parametrization: α=0.5, w=1 (numeraire), g=0.05, A0=1,=γ=0, L=300, Lf=2,
ε=4.4,=pΕ=4.=The energy-capital ratio is equal to ψ=0.2=in the low energy-intensitiy case
and ψ=4=in the high energy-intensity case. This results in T=9 and T=10, respectively.
Details are available upon request from the authors.
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The bold line in Figure 5 illustrates the case with relatively high energy efficiency. Here
the story is opposite: because of the relative low energy-intensity the price of capital
forms a relatively large part of the cost of the capital-energy composite and, hence, the
demand for vintages is relatively sensitive to a change in capital price. As a result, the
market power of the producers of vintage capital is reduced as compared to the energy-
intensive case, which leads to a lower mark-up and thus a reduction in the mass of
vintages that is sustained in the economy. Furthermore, a low level of energy-intensity
yields a relative low price of intermediates because of the relative low energy costs of
the capital-energy composite. As a consequence, firms in the final goods sector employ,
ceteris paribus, a relative high demand for vintage capital, leading to a relative high
amount of labour used to produce vintage capital (see (14) and (15)). This is reflected
by an upward shift of the demand curve for vintages. Applying the same logic, a low
energy price yields the same result.
Now we can easily see that imposing an energy tax has two effects. First, it will, ceteris
paribus, reduce the amount of energy used because of a lower demand for vintage
capital. Second, it will slow down the modernisation of the capital stock in the
economy. The first effect results from the increasing costs of the capital-energy
composite and the second effect stems from the fact that producers of vintages need less
demand to compensate for the fixed costs as they are able to set a higher mark-up. Of
course, the first effect depends on the assumption of complementarity between capital
and energy and the second effect applies only in case of a constant energy-capital ratio
for all vintages.
What happens to a firm when a new energy-saving technology arrives on the market?
Of course, the firm will invest in the new technology since the new technology is better,
ceteris paribus. Because of the complementarity effect, however, firms continue to
invest in old technologies as well and we thus have a transition period. Figure 6 shows a
firm’s demand for vintages at a particular point in time after the (exogenous) arrival of a
new energy-saving technology at time t=S.
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Figure 6. Demand for vintages during transition to new technology.
The demand curve for vintages essentially combines the two demand curves depicted in
Figure 5. The most recent vintages embody the new energy-saving technology while the
older vintages embody the older technology. As we argued above, an increase in energy
efficiency reduces the mark-up set by the producer of a vintage and, hence, increases the
minimal demand L  needed to compensate for the fixed costs. As a result the demand
curve for vintage capital is discontinuous during the transition period.
Finally, we analyse the effect of an increase in energy price on the demand for different
vintages when we allow for (exogenous) improvement of energy-efficiency over time.
In other words, we relax the assumption of a constant energy-capital ratio, i.e. 0ƒ> .
This means that more recent vintages are less energy-intensive than older vintages. The
amount of labour used for the production of vintages can be derived from the
generalised version of equation (19) (see Appendix B)
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This expression reveals that in the presence of exogenous improvements of the energy-
efficiency of newer vintages (f>0), more labour is used for the production of more
recent vintages (higher τ). This implies that the lines in Figures 5 and 6 get steeper as
compared to the case with a constant energy-capital ratio for all vintages (f=0). Let us
now consider what happens when the energy price increases, for example as a result of
an energy tax. First, the demand for more recent vintages increases, as they are more
energy-efficient, which is reflected by a steeper demand curve. Second, producers of
final goods shift away from capital as the capital-energy composite becomes more
expensive. This is reflected by a downward shift of the demand curve. Third, firms in
the final good sector become less sensitive to changes in the capital price because of
increased energy costs in the capital-energy composite. This creates increasing market
power for the producers of vintages who subsequently set a higher mark-up and, hence,
need less demand for their vintage to compensate for their fixed costs. This slows down
scrapping of older energy-intensive vintages. This effect works opposite to the previous
two effects which speed up scrapping of older vintages. It can be shown, however, that
the previous two effects dominate for reasonable parameter values10, so a higher energy
price reduces the number of vintages that can be sustained and above all lowers the
demand for vintage capital. As a result, the amount of energy used in the economy is
reduced. This conclusion, however, applies only in the short en medium term. Because
the capital-energy composite becomes more energy-efficient over time, and thus
cheaper, the demand for vintage capital increases over time. Numerical experiments
show that for reasonable parameter values the effect of increased energy-efficiency
outweighs the effect of a historical increase in the energy price in the long term. As a
result, in the long term there is place for extra vintages to be sustained in the economy.
Although this leads ceteris paribus to an increase in energy use, the capital stock is
relatively energy-efficient in the long term and, hence, the change in energy
consumption in the long term depends crucially on the extent of the exogenous energy
efficiency improvement (f).
5. Conclusion
The widespread adoption of energy-efficient technologies is a lengthy and costly
process. In this paper we developed a vintage model to study the diffusion of energy-
                                                          
10 Numerical experiments so far have shown that the result is valid for a wide range of
parameter values. Details are available from the authors, upon request.
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saving technologies and to explain why diffusion is gradual and why firms continue to
invest in seemingly inferior technologies. An important characteristic of our model is
that vintages are complementary; there are returns to diversity of using different
vintages. We have argued that this is a potentially relevant part of the explanation of the
energy-efficiency paradox: firms will continue investing in older technologies when
newer ones are available. Furthermore, we showed that this effect is intensified when
we take a learning-by-using effect into account. A firm faces loss of expertise on a
particular vintage, gained by virtue of experience, when it switches to a newer vintage
and this provides an extra argument for firms to invest in older vintages.
Our model structure allows for an endogenous determination of the number of vintages
a firm uses. In our analysis we show that the stronger the complementarity between
different vintages and the stronger the learning-by-using effect, the longer it takes
before firms scrap (seemingly) inferior technologies. Furthermore, we show the
opposite effect that an increase in energy-efficiency and an increase of the energy price
speeds up scrapping of older technologies. Finally, we show that in the presence of
continuous energy-efficiency improvements a higher energy price leads to a lower
energy consumption in the short and medium term, mainly because of a decrease in the
demand for vintage capital. In the long term the energy-efficiency improvement
compensates for the higher energy price: the capital-energy composite becomes cheaper
which leads to an increasing demand for vintage capital. Since the capital stock is
relatively energy-efficient in the long term, an answer to the question as to whether the
increase in the capital stock leads to increased energy consumption depends on the
extent of the (exogenous) energy efficiency improvement.
Clearly, the simple model developed in this paper could be extended in a number of
interesting directions. First, we could allow for the endogenous determination of the rate
of learning-by-using, the rate of improvement of new vintages and the increase in
energy-efficiency. We refer here to Aghion and Howitt (1996) for such a kind of
analysis, drawing a distinction between research (developing new vintages) and
development (improving existing vintages). Second, we could allow for the incomplete
depreciation of capital in order to assess the importance of complementarity in
understanding the development of the stock of capital of different vintages and the
investment behaviour of firms. Third, the production structure could be modeled in a
more realistic way by allowing for substitution between energy and capital.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we determine the allocation of labour over the production or
assemblage of final goods and the production of vintages, respectively. Using the fact
that cost shares of capital and intermediates are constant, we can determine the
allocation of labour. This results in an expression for the labour used to produce vintage
capital. Recall from equation (13) that
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Recall that we assumed that the energy price Etp  and the mark-up        are uniform for
all vintages. Furthermore, recall that we assume for simplicity that the energy-capital
ratio τψ  is the same for all vintages ( τψ ψ= ). Subsequently, equation (A.1) reads as:
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Rewriting yields:
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which corresponds to equation (14) in the main text.
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Substituting this equation in the definition for the labour market equilibrium (equation
(9) in the main text) yields:
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Rewriting yields the expression for the labour used to produce the capital stock:
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which corresponds to equation (15) in the main text (we omit time indices in the main
text).
Appendix B
In this appendix we derive an expression that relates the production of each vintage to
the production of the oldest vintage ,t T tK K −= . Substituting equation (13) into
equation (12) of the main text yields:
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When we take for the vintage with index s the oldest vintage with index t-T equation
(B.1) develops in:
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Recall that , ,t K tK Lτ τ=  (equation (7) in the main text) and that 0
fe ττψ ψ −=
(equation (5) in the main text). Furthermore, recall that we assumed absence of learning,
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τ =  (see equation (3)). Substituting these expressions into equation (B.2)
yields:
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Rewriting yields:
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From equation (18) in the main text it can be seen that the labour used to produce the
oldest vintage, 
tTKt
L
,−
, equals the minimal demand needed for the producer of that
vintage to be able to operate profitably, that is K L= . As a result the demand
(production) for each vintage can be related to the demand (production) for the oldest
vintage in the market according to:
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Rewriting yields:
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where T t tτ− < <  , ( )f f t Te eτ− − −< . When we assume a constant energy-capital
ratio ( τψ ψ= ), i.e. 0f = , the second term at the right hand of equation (B.6)
becomes 1 and hence equation (B.6) reduces to
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This corresponds to equation (19) in the main text.
